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Abstract

In response to the murder of George Floyd in May 2020, the Black Lives Matter
movement issued a statement calling on cities to Defund the Police. The event sparked a
nationwide reckoning that has reshaped the narratives and strategies for remedying the racial bias
and police brutality apparent in the criminal justice system. The shift in police reform efforts
embraces notions guiding police budgeting decisions. Today's advocates are transforming their
approach to police reform to include budgeting decisions by promoting a municipal practice
known as police budget reform. This Capstone explores the feasibility of successful police
budget reform under current administrative structures by asking, what influences municipal
capacity to reform police budgets? Using San Francisco and its police department's budget as a
case study, this thesis demonstrates how informal perceptions and binding agreements create
barriers to reallocating police funds. Four significant factors—San Francisco's pro-labor
sentiment, a city's perception of police budget reform, collective bargaining for public safety, and
the role of the mayor—most influence a city's ability to alter the status quo of police budgeting
practices and outcomes. The findings are presented here in hopes that police budget reform may
be better understood by policing academics and Defund the Police advocates navigating the new
landscape of police reform and avenues for success.

Introduction

In May 2020, a video went viral exposing the murder of George Floyd, a 46-year-old
unarmed Black man, by a Minneapolis police officer who knelt on Floyd's neck to the point of
suffocation. Despite hearing Floyd say that he could not breathe, the White police officer ignored
his pleas and continued excessive restraint for nearly ten minutes. 1 Floyd's death marked the
182nd police killing of a Black individual in 2020 up to that point and is said to be symbolic of
the systemic racial bias present in past and modern policing.2 Racial justice and police reform
advocates, who increasingly associate themselves with the interests of Black Lives Matter, argue
that Floyd's death was a 'breaking point' between law enforcement and Black communities
moving forward.3
The United States has done little to resolve the racist and harmful policies in policing that
have consistently put Black, Indigenous and People of Color (BIPOC) at a high risk of overpolicing, prejudice, and violence.4 The problem lies in the way policing was conceived. After the
U.S. abolished slavery in 1865, certain states, predominately in the south, found the means to
subject Black individuals to harsh criminal sanctions for laws not applicable to Whites (e.g., Jim

1

Asia News Monitor, "George Floyd Died from Lack of Oxygen, Doctor Testifies," Asia News Monitor, April
12, 2021.
2
FatalEncounters.org, Fatal Encounters: African American/Black, January 1, 2020 - May 26, 2020. Fatal
Encounters, 2021.
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Patrisse Cullors, #DefundThePolice, 2020.
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Munmun De Choudhury et al., "Social Media Participation in an Activist Movement for Racial Equality,"
Proceedings of the ... International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media 2016 (May, 2016), 92-101.
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Crow laws).5 Police officers upheld these racially biased laws and were even charged themselves
for inciting mob violence against BIPOC communities.6
Census data from the late 19th and early 20th centuries worsened discriminatory practices
in the criminal justice system. Data from these eras revealed that police incarcerated Black
individuals at disproportionate rates than Whites. This statistic became a foundational aspect for
the perception of BIPOC communities and individuals being more dangerous than White
Americans. The racial bias in policing continued throughout the 20th century but is especially
apparent in instances such as in the Midwest after the Great Migration, the 1960's civil rights
movement, and the broken windows philosophy in the 1990s.7 The perception that Black
individuals, in particular, posed a threatening presence was a reason for cities choosing to adopt
racially biased policing policies that remain destructive to BIPOC communities to this day.
Overwhelming amounts of data suggest that Black individuals who suffer from mental
illness are more likely to be confronted by police officers than the average citizen.8 In 2015 data
also showed that the risk of being stopped by law enforcement is x16 times higher for people
with untreated mental illnesses; as a result, a quarter of fatal law enforcement shootings involve
an individual with a mental health illness.9 Police reformists and academics find that relying on
police to perform duties outside their scope of expertise, like responding to mental illness
complications, exacerbates police-communal relations.

5

Anna North, "How Racist Policing Took Over American Cities, Explained by a Historian," Vox.Com, June 6,
2020.
6
Ibid
7
North, "How Racist Policing Took Over American Cities, Explained by a Historian," 2020.
8
Ibid
9
Doris A. Fuller et al., Overlooked in the Undercounted: The Role of Mental Illness in Fatal Law Enforcement
Encounters, 2016.
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For decades, there have been attempts at changing harmful policing practices through
methods known as police reforms. Police reforms aim to transform police culture, policies, and
procedures—emphasizing officer accountability and communal oversight. 10 For example, police
departments invest in implicit bias training courses for their officers to remove racial prejudice. 11
Some cities have also funded reform initiatives such as civilian oversight boards and body-worn
cameras to increase officer accountability while on patrol. 12 Yet even though 21st-century
reforms are some of the most extensive police reforms in history, Black individuals are still
killed by police officers at disproportionate rates while officers are rarely held accountable for
the murders.13 These facts have encouraged advocates for police reform and racial justice to
merge efforts and build coalitions that uplift BIPOC communities away from police violence.
Leading the national call for contemporary police reform and racial justice is the Black
Lives Matter movement (BLM). This decentralized social-justice movement aims to protect and
prevent Black Americans from discrimination and violence inflicted on their communities. 14
Since its inception, BLM has played a crucial role in bringing national attention to police killings
and advocating for policymakers to enact new police reform measures.15 Most notably, Black
Lives Matter advocates have responded to dozens of high-profile murders by hosting large
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demonstrations against police violence and in support of various police reform initiatives. 16
Despite successfully implementing police reforms and increasing media attention, Black
Lives Matter advocates still find that police violence is a significant cause of injury and death for
Black, Indigenous and People of Color. 17 Black individuals, for instance, are three times more
likely to be killed by police, even though they are less likely to be armed or engaging in a violent
act at the time of their initial interaction with the police.18 These observations demonstrate that
there has been little progress in removing racial bias and police violence regardless of the
investment in police reform.
Compounding systemic racism in the criminal justice system is disinvestment in social
services in communities affected by over-policing, recidivism, and lethal encounters with
police.19 In the absence of social services, cities often choose to fund police departments to
increase their role in overseeing problems in mental health, substance abuse, and homelessness.20
Unfortunately, this action translates to fewer dollars available for community-led services with
on-staff specialists able to respond to these distinct crises.21
The lack of investment into BIPOC communities and the failure of reforms to remove the
racial bias and violence in law enforcement increasingly frustrated the Black Lives Matter
movement over the past seven years. The 'breaking point' between police departments and Black

16

Jackie Menjivar, "Black Lives Matter Protests: What's been Achieved so Far," DoSomething.Org, August 3,
2020.
17
Penn Medicine News, "Fatal Police Shootings among Black Americans Remain High, Unchanged since
2015," PennMedicine.Org, (October 28, 2020).
18
Mapping Police Violence, 2021.
19
Nazgol Ghandnoosh, Black Lives Matter: Eliminating Racial Inequity in the Criminal Justice System. The
Sentencing Project The Sentencing Project (Washington, DC): 2015.
20
Human Rights Watch, A Roadmap for Re-Imagining Public Safety in the United States: 14 Recommendations
on Policing, Community Investment, and Accountability. 1-29.
21
Ibid
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communities occurred after the murder of George Floyd in May 2020; afterward, the BLM
movement stating,
George Floyd’s violent death was a breaking point — an all too familiar reminder
that, for Black people, law enforcement doesn’t protect or save our lives. They
often threaten and take them... We call for a national defunding of police. We
demand investment in our communities and the resources to ensure Black people
not only survive, but thrive.22

This statement marked a shift from traditional routes of implementing police reform to a
campaign demanding reallocation of funds and discretion for community-led organizations. This
campaign adopted the slogan #DefundthePolice (i.e., Defund the Police), whose mission includes
informing the country about the harmful effects of budgeting for police departments. 23 The
Defund the Police campaign has effectively joined conversations about police spending and
failures in reform into a movement for advocating "police budget reform."
Police budget reform is a strategy that reduces funds meant for a police department's
budget and reallocates those dollars to support community-based alternatives. This shift in
approach to police reform maintains components of contemporary methods of police reform
(e.g., homelessness services; local restorative justice programs). However, it does so with an
equal, if not more, emphasis on divesting in police department operations. As a result, defund the
Police advocates face a new set of obstacles found in municipal structures by transitioning to
advocacy for budget reform.
The nationwide efforts to implement police budget reform have merged into municipal

22
23

Cullors, #DefundThePolice, 2020.
Black Lives Matter Canada. "Defund the Police Website," 2021.
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settings because a city's general fund is responsible for most department budget allocations.24 A
transition towards city hall implies that national and statewide coalitions have become
increasingly fractured and now face unique circumstances based on their own city's policing
concerns. Nonetheless, the goals motivating all police budget reform advocates remain the same,
that is, influencing their city officials to consider reallocating funds away from police
departments.
Police reform has recently focused on adding programs and initiatives that combat police
officers' discriminatory and often violent practices. The critical difference in police budget
reform is that reform initiatives involve removing programs that have proven harmful or
ineffective. Local campaigns to Defund the Police in cities across the United States share the
sentiment that removing policing through budgetary divestment is a better alternative than fixing
systemic problems in policing policies and culture. However, there has been little discussion in
policing scholarship and advocacy groups about the feasibility of this practice.
This Capstone explores the potential of a city to enact police budget reform under current
administrative structures and relationships guiding police budgeting practices. During the
research sections, I suspend conversations on the virtues and strategies for police budget reform
to analyze the probability that a city can entertain future Defund the Police proposals during
police budgeting. Measuring the achievability of police budget reform is crucial for police
reform scholars and advocates before defining alternatives for removed police services.
However, certain obstacles or opportunities may affect the ability of these reforms to obtain
funding, and without available funds to implement new programs, attempts at reform will

24
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expectedly fail.
San Francisco is an example of a city willing to entertain the notion and possibilities of
police budget reform.25 City leaders hear the calls of the Defund the Police movement
scrutinizing the $670 million police budget for FY2020-21.26 In response to massive and
prolonged demonstrations against these budget allocations, Mayor London Breed announced,
"The Dream Keeper Initiative." This program reallocates $120 million from law enforcement
over the next two years (from the police and sheriff's department combined) towards Black
communities impacted by disinvestment and problematic policing.27 This shift in the direction
towards police budget reform signals support from city leaders while demonstrating that the city
can reform the police budget's status quo.
Nevertheless, local activists in San Francisco argue that the city can take more drastic
measures in reforming the San Francisco Police Department's (SFPD) budget. Defund SFPD
Now, the local police budget reform coalition, identifies the harmful effects of each line item
expenditure in the police budget and recommends removing most, if not all of these costs.28
Defund SFPD Now, and even the San Francisco police commissioner claims these cuts
insignificantly affect current operations.29 The affirmation from both advocates and the police

25

Cornell Barnard and Alix Martichoux, San Francisco Mayor London Breed Announces Cuts to Police in New
City Budget, ABC7News.com, 2020).
26
Megan Cassidy and Joaquin Palomino, "SF's Spending and Hiring Spree on Police Comes to an End, but
Where Will Cuts Come from?" San Francisco Chronicle, June 13, 2020.
27
Matthew Green, SF Mayor Breed Unveils Plan for Reinvesting $120 Million from Police into Black
Communities, KQED.com, 2021.
28
Afrosocialist Caucus SF and DSA SF Justice Committee, DEFUND SFPD NOW. A Policy Proposal to
Defund, Disband, and Disarm the San Francisco Police Department. Defund SFPD Now (San Francisco, CA):
2020.
29
Green, SF Mayor Breed Unveils Plan for Reinvesting $120 Million from Police into Black Communities,
2021.
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suggests that The Dream Keeper Initiative does not remove enough funding to reform policing
practices.
This Capstone attempts to define the factors that influence the capacity of San Francisco
to remove police funding in favor of community-based alternatives. San Francisco provides an
ideal setting because the city has already implemented a police budget reform through The
Dream Keeper Initiative and openly provides information regarding police spending and
budgeting practices. In addition, as a graduate student researcher, I have access to many city
officials involved in police reform and police budgeting processes, which also contributed to the
reasoning for this location of study. This ideal environment provides my research with a more
comprehensive understanding of what factors prevent, maintain, and allow San Francisco to
reform the SFPD's budget further.
Using San Francisco and its police department as a case study, my thesis asks what
influences municipal capacity to reform police budgets? Throughout this project, I find that the
most influential factors affecting the city's ability to implement police budget reform are
informal perceptions and binding agreements that illustrate obstacles to reallocating police funds.
An analysis of budget documents, administrative practices, and labor agreements involving the
San Francisco Police Department demonstrates that contemporary municipal budgeting practices
prevent reforming the majority of the police department's budget. City officials claim that these
formal barriers to budget reform are frequently the result of relationships and unofficial
budgeting practices that inherently affect police department budgeting decisions. Defund the
Police advocates and policing scholars must acknowledge the obstacles to including municipal
budgeting policies in reform efforts; otherwise, future attempts at reform may be subject to
failure once the municipality takes part in the process. This thesis identifies the four most

9
influential factors affecting a municipality's capacity to reform its police department's budget and
what these factors imply about the feasibility of implementing this type of reform. While data in
this study suggests multiple barriers to police budget reform implementation, these findings also
provide academics and Defund the Police advocates with considerations on overcoming these
obstacles in municipal settings.
This thesis defines the most significant influences on a city's ability to reform police
budgets throughout five stages. Starting with a review of the scholarship on contemporary police
reform and police spending, this Capstone explains how my inquiry into municipal capacity
extends the conversation on how police budget reform implementation would occur under
current conditions. The following section outlines the mixed methods approach I used during this
case study involving San Francisco and its police department. Next, I provide a brief history of
San Francisco Police Department budgeting and what a shift in budgeting authority over time
means for attempts at police budget divestment.
In the fourth section of this Capstone, I analyze data from budget documents and labor
agreements and compare this information with information and insight from city officials to
measure certain factors' influence on budgeting outcomes. In the final portion of this case study,
I discuss the significance of defining these obstacles for police reform advocates and scholars
navigating the future of police budget reform. Before providing insight into each factor affecting
police budget reform, I will review previous discussions regarding police reform, budgeting
decisions, and how unions affect the potential for these two concepts to merge.

10
II. Literature Review

This section reviews policing literature written about the most recommended approaches
to police reform over the past four decades: community-oriented and problem-oriented policing.
This section will illustrate how police reform scholars who offer research and recommendations
on these types of reform oftentimes do so without regard to the climate surrounding policecommunal relations during the implementation stage.
This literature review then lays out the two competing theories on what most influences
police budgeting decisions: the demands of citizens or preference for using an incremental
formula. After defining these two budgeting models, I describe how both approaches are limited
in explaining police budget outcomes. Still, the most considerable constraint in this body of
literature is that neither provides evidence of how calls for police reform can shape budgeting
outcomes.
The last section of this review discusses how police unions and labor agreements
influence decisions regarding police budget reform. This final body of literature is significant
because it is the first sign of conversations considering police reform and budgeting decisions.
With that said, scholarship has yet to analyze whether other factors outside of police unions
would affect the feasibility of implementing police budget reform.
During this literature review, each body of literature represents a stage in a timeline that
describes how initial attempts at police reform have evolved to consider a municipality's role in
police budget reform. I detail relevant findings to demonstrate the current understanding of
police budget reform in today's environment, providing a starting point for future research on the
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topic. While the literature on police budget reform is slim, there is no lack of scholarship on the
foundational aspects of police reform, which I examine in the following subsection.

Police Reform
Community-oriented and problem-oriented policing are frequently cited as the most
effective means for reform in contemporary policing scholarship. Problem-oriented policing is a
strategy involving individual officer accountability when solving problems unique to their
community.30 Over time, scholars recommended reform strategies that complimented problemoriented policing but emphasized a high level of community participation. Community-oriented
policing is a municipal policing practice that offers citizens an active role in improving their
neighborhood's public safety.31 These policing strategies would provide the foundation for
modern-day police reform initiatives; however, the implementation and outcomes of these
reforms are also why today's police reform advocates are shifting focus to budgetary
reallocations.
The basis for modern-day police reform strategy was introduced in the late 1970s-1980s
by police reform scholars who shared public dissatisfaction with corrupt and ineffective
policing.32 As a result, municipal police departments adopted various practices developed by
community and problem-oriented policing scholars to remedy these concerns.33 Problemoriented policing is a strategy for improving the quality of policing by training officers to focus

30

Herman Goldstein, "Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach," Crime and Delinquency 25, no. 2
(1979), 236-258.
31
Michael D. Reisig, "Community and Problem-Oriented Policing," Crime & Justice 39 (2010), 1-53.
32
Ibid
33
David H. Bayley, "Police Reform: Who done it?" Policing & Society 18, no. 1 (2008), 7-17.
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on achieving tangible results. In Herman Goldstein's (1979) article "Improving Policing: A
Problem-Oriented Approach," Goldstein argues that law enforcement should implement a
process that concentrates on defining problems and finding solutions unique to each police
department's jurisdiction. Thus, problem-oriented policing serves as an internal policing
mechanism that places accountability on individual police officers to consider their actions and
what kind of actions will produce the broadest impact on public safety.34
Over time, problem-oriented policing became more inclusive of communities and
individuals about creating new methods for public safety. The growing inclusion of community
members in reform strategies built atop the foundational aspects of problem-oriented policing.
Eventually, problem-oriented policing became the steppingstone and just one component of a
more comprehensive policing system known as community-oriented policing.
Community-oriented policing is a cumulation of police reform strategies, including
aspects of problem-oriented policing.35 The literature on police reform describes communityoriented policing as a widescale approach involving how citizens can interact with the police to
promote public safety. For instance, some authors argue that a strategy for community-oriented
policing consists of a police department creating a universal and safe setting for community
members to communicate with officers.36 Like this holistic alternative, community-oriented
policing strategies are not prescriptive and allow interpretation based on a specific individual or
collective need. Scholars who support community-oriented policing do not prescribe a strict set

34

Reisig, "Community and Problem-Oriented Policing," 1-53, 2010.
Herman Goldstein, "Toward Community-Oriented Policing: Potential, Basic Requirements, and Threshold
Questions," Crime & Delinquency 33 (1987), 6-30.
36
Valentina Petrova, "The Future of our Freedom," Journal of Integral Theory & Practice 9, no. 2 (2014), 153161.
35
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of approaches because this alternative policing strategy is not about the ways to reform police
but about reaching a goal of improving community and police relations.
However, reaching this goal is dependent on the participation of all parties involved.
Community and problem-oriented policing scholar Wesley Skogan writes that police reforms
encounter limitations if both community members and a police department do not agree about
the methods involved in police reform strategies. Skogan (2008) writes:

Organizations representing the interests of community members may not have a
tradition of cooperating with police. Because their constituents often fear the
police, groups representing low-income and minority areas may be more
interested in monitoring police misconduct and pressing for greater police
accountability to civilians than in becoming closely identified with them. 37

Skogan suggests that the methods to achieving community-oriented policing are complicated
when there is a history of police-communal mistrust. As described in Skogan's study, the lack of
confidence between parties reveals that the barriers to police reform are not in their design but
rather their implementation. Scholarship on police reform over the past 40 years has focused on
building strategies for remedying police-communal relations. In doing so, scholarship on the
topic frequently overlooks the societal conditions preventing reform from implementation and
acceptance.
In addition to lack of trust by communities, participatory resistance within police
departments disrupts the implementation of problem-oriented and community-oriented
policing.38 When faced with adopting new police reform initiatives, scholars report that police
management (generally consisting of senior-level officers) are skeptical about reforms crafted by

37
38

Wesley G. Skogan, "Why Reforms Fail," Policing & Society 18, no. 1 (2008), 23-34.
Ibid
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civilians who have little-to-no experience in law enforcement.39 Hence, when the police put
reforms to practice, they may disingenuously involve community members. I found that much of
the literature I reviewed relied implicitly on the condition that police officers would embrace
reform methods after adopting policing alternatives. However, in Skogan's critique, he described
that there was little evidence suggesting that policing problems, such as racial bias, public safety,
and community relations, were improved even after implementing police reform strategies.40
This literature on contemporary police reform demonstrates that without regard to the
existing levels of trust and participation between communities and their police, problem-oriented
and community-oriented policing are promising solutions to problems in law enforcement
practices. The problem is that disregarding the amount of trust and participation in police reform
implementation ignores how these alternatives will be agreed upon and consistently practiced.
After decades of police violence and failed attempts at reform, disadvantaged communities have
little reason to trust the police to implement and participate wholeheartedly.41
These considerations lend support as to why current police reform efforts have shifted
focus to resource allocation advocacy. The narrative of individuals living in communities
negatively impacted by policing is that reforms will be more successful if they have discretion
over implementation. However, even well-resourced community-led organizations are unlikely
to afford the time, but more importantly, the funds necessary to implement reforms without a
police department's resources. 42 So, many modern-day police reformists have reorganized their

39

Bayley, "Police Reform: Who done it?" (2008), 7-17.
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41
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Russell L. Smith and Thomas M. Uhlman, "Police Policy and Citizen Satisfaction: Evidence from Urban
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campaign strategies to advocate for reallocating police funds towards community-led
organizations. This shift in narrative demonstrates how conversations about police reform are
now considering the effects of police department funding.

Police Budgeting
Determining the number of police reforms available is the department's budget. A police
department's budget decides the composition of the police force and often guides the policies
within. However, what determines the department's total budget allocations is a matter of debate.
Literature on police budgeting shows that there two major conflicting theories as to what
influences police budgeting decisions. One group of policing scholars suggest that public
opinion, measured by citizens' demands for certain levels of police spending, plays a significant
role in shaping budgeting decisions. On the other hand, some argue that police budgeting is
entirely unaffected by exogenous factors and instead decided upon by incremental adjustments
based on the previous year's budget.
Policing scholars who recognize that public opinion most influences police budgeting
decisions argue in favor of what is known as the "demands model" of police budgeting.43 For
example, authors Brenden Beck and Adam Goldstein found that as Americans became
increasingly reliant on their real estate investments in the 1990s, police strength and spending
grew according to citizens' demands to have their property safeguarded. 44 Although, their

43

Rick Ruddell and Matthew O Thomas, "Minority Threat and Police Strength: An Examination of the Golden
State," Police Practice & Research 11, no. 3 (2010), 256-273.
44
Brenden Beck and Adam Goldstein, "Governing through Police? Housing Market Reliance, Welfare
Retrenchment, and Police Budgeting in an Era of Declining Crime," Social Forces 96, no. 3 (2018), 11831210.
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research found that citizen-demands, like those regarding real estate, often held racial
undertones. Beck and Goldstein claim that publicized fear among white voters who perceived
minority populations as encroaching upon and jeopardizing their communities was the reason for
police department growth.45 It is this finding that best described what police budgeting scholars
refer to as “racial threat.”
One concern by authors who discuss the demands-model of budgeting is that citizens
demand increased police services in areas with growing minority populations—otherwise known
as budgeting for racial threat. For example, policing scholars Rick Ruddell and Matthew O.
Thomas (2010) use California as a case study to compare the demand for increased police
services in predominately white versus more racially diverse areas. Their research found that the
demand for police services was higher in regions of the state that were becoming more racially
mixed, which spurred increased police department spending.46 Authors Robert Vargas and
Phillip McHarris (2017) bolstered Thomas's and Ruddell's claims through their research that
found that the rising Latino and immigrant population increased the demands for police services
in some cities.
There is another group of scholars, however, who claim that police department budgeting
decisions are unaffected by exogenous factors or perceptions, such as racial threat. Instead, these
authors argue that the strongest determinant for police budgeting decisions is the budget's
composition, or organization, in the years prior. In the "organizational model" of police
budgeting, the previous year's budget influences how much a police department will receive for

45
46
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the upcoming year.47 Quantitative data in this body of literature demonstrates that for the first
half of the 20th century, budgetary allocations for municipal police departments grew at slow
and incremental rates.48 More recent studies have produced similar findings, including how
sociopolitical conditions barely affect the gradual nature of police budgeting outcomes.49 And,
for instance, when the financial demands of the city are stressed, policymakers still decide to
model the police budget based on the previous year's allocations rather than involve themselves
in detailing a new one.50 Thus, for scholars who support the theories behind the organizational
model, it stands that racial threat does not factor into policymakers' final police budgeting
decisions.
Although, in my review of this body of literature I found limitations to accepting that
either model is the primary determinant for police budgeting outcomes. The concern I raise is
with the lack of evidence that these factors can affect budgeting decisions inversely. In the
scholarship supporting the demands model, scarce quantitative data demonstrates that police
budget allocations react to citizen demands inversely (i.e., showing decreased spending in areas
absent of racial threat). The absence of evidence showing noticeable fluctuations in budgetary
allocations suggests that the demands model does not determine all police budgeting decisions;
instead, it only affects the decisions that increase budget allocations.

47

Beck, "Governing through Police? Housing Market Reliance, Welfare Retrenchment, and Police Budgeting
in an Era of Declining Crime," (2018), 1183-1210.
48
David J. Bordu and Edward W. Haurek, "The Police Budget's Lot: Components of the Increase in Local
Police Expenditures, 1902-1960," Amer Behav Sci 13, 1970.
49
Jihong Zhao, Ling Ren and Nicholas P. Lovrich, "Budgetary Support for Police Services in US
Municipalities: Comparing Political Culture, Socioeconomic Characteristics and Incrementalism as Rival
Explanations for Budget Share Allocation to Police," Journal of Criminal Justice 38, no. 3 (May, 2010), 266275.
50
Gregory B. Lewis, "Municipal Expenditures through Thick and Thin," Publius 14, no. 2 (Apr 1, 1984), 3139.

18
Police budgeting scholars who support the theory that police budgeting decisions are
organizational, on the other hand, do not entertain the idea that the reason for incremental
budgeting is due to citizens demanding gradual budgeting practices. Moreover, a modest amount
of qualitative evidence in this body of literature suggests that citizens' demands do not affect the
outcome of budgetary increases. This lack of evidence leaves a gap in understanding why police
spending rises in some areas beyond what could be considered gradual.
Another reservation I maintain in accepting that police budgeting is purely organizational
or demands-based is that these budgeting models do not consider the effects of police reform.
Demands-based modeling is rooted in the notions of racial threat, while recent police reform
efforts carry sentiments opposite of this racial stratification. Thus, the current narrative
concerning the demands model counters the goals of contemporary police budget reformists.
Organizational budgeting decisions host limited capacity for a police department to increase
costs to implement new reforms. However, a body of literature in policing scholarship can
synthesize these two budgeting theories while considering police reform —and that is the
scholarship on police labor organizations.

Police Unions & Labor Agreements
Police unions, until recently, have been overlooked as a significant factor for what
determines police reform from entering budgeting decisions. Collective bargaining agreements
(i.e., labor contracts or labor agreements) are a prime example of how police unions influence
their department's budget outcome. These are legally binding documents that ensure funding and
high-quality working conditions for their union's members. Police labor contracts promote the
livelihood of union members, yet they are also often used to defend against reforming the status
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quo.
According to recent scholarship on police unions, labor agreements prevent police reform
by protecting certain practices and procedures. For example, legal scholars Catherine Fisk and
L.S. Richardson (2017) argue that when unions secure collective bargaining agreements with
their respective cities regarding "working conditions," the definition of these conditions is vast
and inclusive of protections against disciplinary procedures. 51 In some cases, according to Fisk
and Richardson, labor contracts involve amendments that give the police union the right to
define the time and structure of officer misconduct hearings.52 Thus, implementing reform aimed
at officer accountability, like problem-oriented policing practices, stands at odds with largely
inaccessible municipal contracts.
Collective bargaining expert Stephen Rushin (2017) explains that municipalities
negotiate authority over officer disciplinary procedures via trade-offs with budgetary allocations.
This process is often absent of high-ranking government officials, rank-and-file officers, and
members of the public. Rushin argues that increasing transparency and participation in the
collective bargaining process, for instance, will expose whether the current nature of budgeting
in exchange for police reform has proven effective. 53 While the level of transparency Rushin is
calling for has yet to be seen in recent labor negotiations, the author suggests that police reform
influences budgeting decisions during the collective bargaining process.
The collective bargaining process strengthens the police union's ability to protect their
members and their organization's budget. An article on police union contracts published by the
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Administrative Science Quarterly states that when unions secure contracts with their city, police
departments maintain a larger share of the city's budget than before their agreement was in
place.54 An additional study published by authors Ann Bartel and David Lewin (1981) states that
police unions who enter into collective bargaining agreements with their respective cities can
continuously offer higher wages and fringe benefits. Like protections set for officer working
conditions, these budgeting decisions consider a vast number of financial interests. These
findings suggest that the demands of police unions frequently translate into protections against
reductions to budgetary growth.
A collective bargaining specialist, Harry Katz, researched how police unions can
maintain budgetary growth through protections codified in collective bargaining agreements.
Katz finds that the financial arrangements in police union contracts can support what police
budget scholars see as utilizing organizational-model budgeting.55 His research demonstrates that
police labor contracts significantly affect budgetary decision-making because they protect their
members' wages and benefits from reductions. This claim means that, at the very least, some
portion of the budget will remain fixed from year to year. Katz's research also gives reason to
consider that gradual increases in budgeting are due to labor contracts demanding annual and
steady growth for their members' compensation rates.
These police union scholars exhibit how unions influence both police reform and
budgeting outcomes. Thus, this body of literature is currently central to explaining how police
reform can enter conversations about police budgeting. However, labor agreements, in this case,
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are barriers to synthesizing these two concepts. Yet, the word "agreement" connotates that other
parties are involved in reaching a binding arrangement; in this case, the municipality represents
the other party involved. In all three of these bodies of policing literature, a city's role is
seemingly monolithic, leaving little room for understanding how the municipality factors into the
decision-making process. I find this lack of representation—by a party so integral to collective
bargaining agreements—in policing scholarship questionable because a municipality takes part
in approving police budgets and reforms.

Conclusion
These three bodies of policing literature—police reform, police budgeting, and police
unions & labor agreements—demonstrate that the concept of police budget reform in urban and
public affairs scholarship is in its earliest phases. Police reform experts and scholars offer
promising alternatives to policing but underestimate the difficulties of implementation. With the
problems in communal discretion over resources and trust in police, further consideration of
police reform will include more community-based control and funding.
The notion of resource reallocation in policing scholarship merges with the concepts
identified in the literature discussing police budgeting decisions. According to academics of
police budgeting, if the demands-model of budgeting holds, exogenous factors, such as police
reform efforts, might reshape the distribution of police department funds. However, others argue
that police budgeting decisions are only affected by incremental adjustments based on the
previous year's budget. Thus, for organizational budgeting theorists, calls for police reform
cannot effectively change the outcome of budgeting decisions.
Literature on police unions and labor agreements explain how exogenous factors can
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influence police budgeting decisions as the demands-model suggests. Still, only police unions
and labor agreements have evidenced this as a possibility. Budgetary and reform protections
affected by police unions and collective bargaining agreements secure incremental growth while
simultaneously lessening the opportunity for police reform to enter conversations. Although
significant, the scholarship on police reform has yet to address factors outside of unions and
labor agreements that affect the possibility of police budget reform.
The first area of needed discovery is whether unions are the only factor relevant to the
future of police budget reform. The term "agreement" alone assumes an understanding between
the union and another party. A city is responsible for agreeing to certain labor agreements,
including those that affect budgeting and reform decisions. Thus, there are undoubtedly other
influences that play into police budgeting decisions. In this case, these influences come from the
municipality.
Yet, in these three bodies of literature, a city's role is seemingly monolithic. To date, a
city's capability and significance in determining the outcomes and possibilities of police budget
reform are concepts understated in literature. Knowing how police budget reform can be
implemented and operate within a city are essential considerations for the recent shift in police
reform efforts; however, this knowledge bears no use if this type of reform is not possible for the
city to enact. These concerns guided my line of questioning into one asking whether a city's
capacity to enact police budget reform is fixed or flexible? More specifically, I ask: what
influences municipal capacity to reform police budgets?"
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III. Methods

The previous section stresses the importance of defining the city's capacity to affect
police reform through budgetary changes. This section explains how to measure the city's
capacity through using a multi-methods approach. In this section of the Capstone, I explain the
process of my methodology and rationale for identifying budgeting trends and then speaking
with relevant city officials. This section draws upon Galleta and Cross's 2013 book, Mastering
the Semi-Structured Interview and Beyond, to define how I utilize archival research and
interviews to collect quantitative and qualitative information on police budgeting. While a global
pandemic saturates the information regarding collective bargaining agreements, police budgets,
responses from city officials, my project focuses exclusively on the conditions outside pandemicrelated concerns.
A multi-method approach using documents and interviews is the most appropriate way to
answer what influences a municipality’s capacity to reform their police departments' budget.
This project compiles police budget documents to illustrate when police budgeting outcomes
have fluctuated over time. With this information in mind, my Capstone can answer what factors
influenced the city's decision-making ability after comparing answers from city officials who
explain why police spending has changed.
The complementary nature of archival research and semi-structured interviews allows for
a comparative analysis of the quantitative and qualitative outcomes affecting the capacity for
police budget reform. The first step of this case study is obtaining archival data that provides
information on police budgeting trends and factors that define how the city collectively bargains
with the San Francisco Police Officer's Association (i.e., the city's police union). The following
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step is to reach out to city officials to comment on their experiences' helping determine police
budgeting outcomes and trends. During these interviews, the line of questioning is based on
archival budgetary data, while interviewees were encouraged to suggest further documentation
on police budgeting and reform practices. This way, my Capstone achieves a complete analysis
of the decisions and thoughts of decision-makers during police budgeting.
This case study's multi-method approach utilizing archival data and semi-structured
interviews uses Galleta and Cross's definition of these types of methodology. The authors
describe archival research as a method of data collection then analysis of historical and
contemporary documentation. 56 A tangible record can then offer insight into socioeconomic
trends and political conditions that give history lessons on the topic, provide chronologies of
events and identify trends over time. Especially important to this thesis is that archival research
methods provide information on relevant actors (i.e., city officials who were or are involved in
collective bargaining, police budgeting, or both) that I can reach out to for an interview.
An alternative research method is semi-structured interviews—a technique designed to
elicit data from relevant actors, often nonidentifiable in archival material. According to Galleta
and Cross, semi-structured interviews offer narratives from relevant actors about experiences,
relationships, and conceptualizations about a topic. 57 This type of interviewing addresses
research topics by structuring conversations with relevant actors; however, doing so by allowing
for open-ended questions. Galleta and Cross further define semi-structured interviews as a
method of obtaining information on personal experiences or working conditions that might affect
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their perspective. Gaining perceptions of relevant actors is essential to this case study because it
prompts participants to expand on their professional experience related to their respective city
departments.
To identify trends that contribute to the city's capacity to affect police budget reform, I
utilized four types of archival material: San Francisco budget documents, memoranda of
understanding (i.e., MOUs; collective bargaining agreements; labor contracts), the San Francisco
City Charter, and Bay area newspapers. My research starts with collecting budget documents
from the San Francisco Office of the Controller, including both mayoral proposed budgets and
annual consolidated budgets spanning the last 30 years. Next, I extracted information on police
general fund expenditures (i.e., the number of funds the city can allocate to police departments)
from both budget documents and placed it on a timeline showing the rate of change over thirty
years. Finally, for a comparative analysis with labor contracts, I highlighted any noticeable
changes I found in police budget allocations (i.e., fiscal years where police budgets exceed the
average percentage of growth during the period studied). The final step in archival data analysis
compares amendments in SFPOA MOUs acquired through the Department of Human Resources
via the Sunshine Ordinance in the City charter that might explain the reasoning for noticeable
growth.
After extracting data from the budget documents and MOUs, I compared spending trends
with the city charter and news articles during the same fiscal year. Through their web page
archives, I obtained information on the city charter online, provided by the City and County of
San Francisco and newspapers—specifically the POA Journal, the San Francisco Chronicle, and
the San Francisco Examiner. The purpose of exploring City charter ordinances is to identify
which collective bargaining agreements affect police budgeting and are codified by law.
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News articles are significant resources to conceptualize the socioeconomic or political
climate during the era when the MOUs and police budgets show noticeable change. Therefore,
the use of news articles and other sources of archival material in this project is to identify trends
and observations about police budgeting and pinpoint relevant actors who can potentially serve
as interviewees for comparative analysis.
I based my selection of participants on two primary criteria: 1.) their name or department
appearing in MOUs or other budget-related documents, and 2.) past or current involvement in the
police budgeting process. I ensured full representation of experiences and insights by
interviewing at least one representative per relevant city department (i.e., city departments
involved in police budgeting or collective bargaining). These departments included the mayor’s
office, the board of supervisors, department of human resources, police department, department
of police accountability, and the controller's office. Most participants opted to remain
anonymous during this research, so for uniformity’s sake, all participants' identifying factors
(e.g., names, titles, years they worked in a relevant capacity) are omitted. Based on this criteria,
eight city officials were chosen and participated in my research to provide their unique
experience and perspective on their involvement.
Each interview was structured so that participants could narrate their experience when
taking part in municipal budgeting or SFPOA negotiations in city hall. Based on their expertise,
my line of questioning focused on the archival material they have personal experience or
intimate knowledge. However, addressing these documents did not restrict participants from
speaking on other factors contributing to the city's capacity to affect police budget reform.
Lastly, due to the COVID-19 pandemic and social distancing practices, these interviews took
place over a webcam and lasted 45 to 90 minutes each.
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To measure the city's capacity to enact budgetary changes in the police department, I
began my line of questioning by asking participants to describe their role in determining police
budgeting decisions and collective bargaining agreements. The first portion of each interview
aimed to get participants to describe their experience and understanding of trends found in
budget documents, MOU, news articles, and the city charter. Based on each response, I shifted
the interview's focus to whether they felt they or their department influenced the outcome of
these budget and reform decisions. This strategy included adding questions about their
relationship with the SFPOA, municipal budgeting responsibilities, and the political climate in
San Francisco. The latter end of each interview is driven by theoretical questions, asking
participants to elaborate on factors and administrative nuances they perceived as influencing the
outcome of the SFPD budget but might not be readily available in public documents. The
concluding questions were designed to elicit new data and allow participants to challenge and
comment on observations found in my archival research on budget documents and labor
agreements. Because questioning during my interviews was designed to extract any information
on the topic, my interview protocol remained fluid, flexible, and ever-changing based on the
answers received.
It is important to note that many open-ended questions led to city officials answering with
consideration of the detrimental impacts of COVID-19. At the time of this writing, a global
pandemic is affecting the lives of millions worldwide, with San Franciscans being no exception.
The city is currently managing a county-wide health crisis that now demands the attention of
nearly all city staff. Some participants experienced in police budgeting were also facing other
municipal budgeting obstacles because of a $1.7 billion budget deficit projected over the next
two fiscal years. These conditions would oftentimes convolute participants' answers while
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considering factors outside police budgeting and reform decisions, though, understandably so. To
focus the interview and avoid lengthy discussion of participants' experiences with the COVID-19
pandemic, I would transfer the line of questioning into one asking how their experience dealing
with COVID-19 affected police budgeting and reform decisions. I then follow-up asking if that
experience, in particular, is representative of previous years. If it differed, then the responses
considering the pandemic were not used in this research. This strategy saved time and kept the
interview semi-structured enough to gather only information relevant to my research question.
My research design's hybrid approach of analyzing budget documents, MOUs, the city
charter, and news articles, followed by comparing the narratives of those involved in these
processes, provides a much more comprehensive approach to measuring San Francisco's capacity
to reform its police department's budget. In this project, obtaining qualitative information from
actors involved in collective bargaining corrects, verifies, and challenges the assumptions about
the roles, trends, and factors identifiable in archival documentation.
Given the opportunity to extend the time spent on archival research and interviews, I
would include the perspectives of actors outside the city, specifically local police budget
reformists and SFPOA representatives. In an expanded version of this thesis, I would address
two significant limitations that arise from the absent perspective of these two parties. The first is
that not enough time was available to speak with actors outside the city government who might
offer a valuable perspective on how San Franciscans see the city's ability to affect police budget
reform. Responses from these actors in semi-structured interviews could lend evidence to the
reasoning for noticeable fluctuating budgeting outcomes and provide a new line of questioning
for city officials.
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However, observations from outside actors can also be subject to the current political
climate, which leads to the second limitation of my research. The political climate between law
enforcement and communities of color has reached extreme heights, meaning some actors might
be more inclined to speak than others. Those less willing might be SFPOA representatives who
are currently negotiating a new contract with the city. Additional research could be conducted
after the finalization of the SFPOA MOU when budgetary concerns are less politicized. This
strategy would keep participants from recounting experiences solely based on social and
financial issues within the last year. More specifically, given more time I would expect less
subjective answers about specific roles, trends, and observations of actors outside the municipal
government.
In the past, the relationship between the police and the city and county of San Francisco
contained long-running agreements on working conditions and growing compensation rates that
constricted budget reform flexibility. While notably uncontroversial at the time, police reform
advocates now see these inflexible agreements as means to misuse funds. The perception among
advocates that funds were poorly used in the past, effectively steering police reform initiatives
away from success, is the foundation of why police reformists have considered budget reform in
place of traditional methods. However, San Francisco's healthy relationship with its police dates
back over 100 years. Based on the history presented below, this relationship will need a
considerable transformation to change the police budget's status quo.
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IV. History of San Francisco Police Budgeting

San Francisco's police budgeting history is a story of budgeting authority moving away
from city residents into the hands of the police department itself. In the early 20th century, San
Francisco voters were shaping police department budgets through city-approved measures. Over
time, budget decision-making authority transitioned out of the hands of the people and into more
localized settings involving members of city hall and the police department. The most significant
change in police budgeting practices occurred in the 1990s after the police department gained
newfound popularity and bargaining authority with the city. The last thirty years are especially
significant to police budgeting authority because it is during this time that these decisions
became largely unaffected by the interests of voters.
Since the start of the 20th century, San Francisco residents have played a substantial role
in deciding police budgets. In 1898 San Francisco was granted "home rule" after the city adopted
its first charter. Home rule meant that a city charter, through approval of most resident voters in
San Francisco, gave citizens the right to oversee municipal affairs.58 On November 5, 1907,
voters used home rule to approve an ordinance defining officer wages and working conditions—
marking the city's first time implementing some form of police budgeting policy.59
From then until the mid-1970s, San Francisco voters decided most police budgeting
policies. Between 1907-1975, San Franciscans frequently voted to approve police pension plans
and set wages for police officers, in total having voted for pension plans 45 times and 28 times
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for wage adjustments.60 Most elections yielded positive gains for the police department, but their
successes were still out of the department's control and depended on citizen approval.
A significant amount of the police budget decision-making power left the hands of San
Franciscans in 1975 when voters approved Proposition H. This city ordinance set the pay rates
for officers to equal the average wages paid to their counterparts in California cities with
populations over 350,000.61 The city's voters favored this measure to attract high-quality officers
who might consider elsewhere higher paying in the state to apply and retain currently employed
SFPD officers. By approving Proposition H, budget allocations for officer wages were set and
protected by a formula based on counterpart cities' data. Proposition H also meant that San
Franciscans no longer had the authority to reshape wage formulas. Nonetheless, budgetary
matters city residents could vote on supported the police department's budget growth.
While police wage adjustments no longer appeared on the electoral ballot, San Francisco
residents could vote on other aspects of the police department's budget. For instance, increasing
overtime rates, night pay differentials, premium pays, and facilities bonds were all police
budgeting policies that required voter approval. Most of the propositions regarding these costs
passed successfully throughout the 1980s. These budgetary victories were attributable to the
growing popularity of police on a local and nationwide scale.
By the 1990s, police officers were the most respected public employees in the country. 62
Over half of the country consistently polled that they had confidence in their police departments
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during this time.63 Up until the end of the 1990s, 87% of Californians reported having some level
of confidence in their local police departments. 64 Shortly after the statewide confidence poll, the
Public Policy Institute found that public sentiment in San Franciscans was no exception. Only
5% of residents in the San Francisco area rated their police department poorly in 1998.65 The
high levels of confidence made police officers and their departments exceedingly admired. The
SFPD would capitalize on their public image by introducing a proposition that moves budget
decision-making authority to their ranks.
Proposition D was approved in 1990 to allow the police union to negotiate the majority of
budgetary allocations (e.g., wages, benefits, working conditions for their members.)66 Police
employee representatives took this opportunity to become affiliated with Service Employees
International Union, the city's largest and most influential union in San Francisco, and
consolidate into a single union and bargaining unit for the city's officers (i.e., Local 911).67 An
excerpt from a 1992 edition of the San Francisco Police Officer's Association Journal stated, "the
POA's new status will not only enhance the Association's bargaining powers but strengthen the
collective bargaining power of all SEIU members."68 After the SFPOA and SEIU merged, the
police union representatives were able to negotiate a contract with the city, void of voter
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approval, that increased wages by 5% over three years.69
However, the SFPOA's relationship with SEIU was short-lived. In 1997, members of the
San Francisco Police Officer's Association argued a conflict of interest over resolving labor
disputes among members, in addition to believing membership in the SEIU was a financial
burden.70 The SFPOA questioned SEIU membership fees when they did not support many of the
union's needs (e.g., arbitration, printing privileges, attorneys). The following year SFPOA
disaffiliated with SEIU and quickly shifted their strategy to gaining autonomy over their budget
through political means.
Popularity and bargaining independence made the San Francisco Police Department a
formidable political player during the 1990s. In 1991, San Francisco Mayor Art Agnos was upset
during his re-election campaign by former Chief of San Francisco Police Frank Jordan. 71 Just
two years earlier, Agnos has a 70% approval rating, and up until the election, was projected to
serve another four-year term.72 While Agnos was a highly esteemed leader, it was not enough to
overcome a candidate with police affiliations and a mission to "clean up the streets" of San
Francisco through increased law enforcement presence. This platform earned Jordan the position
as mayor from 1991-1995, and in doing so, highlighted the importance of a police department
endorsement—via the SFPOA—for municipal elections.
The significance of their political endorsement and newfound authority to bargain most
matters regarding compensation set a precedent for how SFPOA can influence budgetary
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outcomes in the modern-day. The influence of their political support was evident when the union
endorsed police-friendly Willie Brown for mayor in 1995. After winning the election, Mayor
Brown would support a collective bargaining agreement proposed by the union to increase
officer pay by 15% over the next four years. 73 Having realized the benefit of having a political
ally in office, the SFPOA preceded to endorse him in the next election in hopes of continuing to
make strides in their budgetary growth and autonomy.74 Over the next two decades this practice
would continue in tandem with less and less involvement of the voters, signifying that the
influence to shape police budgeting matters had shifted almost entirely to the police and its city
leaders.
Bargaining authority, societal popularity, and political influence are immensely different
from those that defined the San Francisco Police Department in the early 20th century. For
nearly 70 years, the only factor influencing police budgeting decisions was the will of San
Franciscans. Without the shift in the 1970s, marked by Proposition H, budgeting decisions might
still operate in that manner. However, by transferring the authority of deciding wage rates for
officers to a statewide formula, followed by police unions and their city leaders—factors
influencing budgeting decisions have become more localized and inaccessible to the public.
The missing element in this timeline is how the city, as an independent actor, influences
police budgeting outcomes in accordance with its residents and police department. San
Francisco's history demonstrates that voters, mandated budgeting formulas, and the police
department have primarily decided budgeting decisions. Yet, as its own entity, the city takes
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some responsibility for this shift in decision-making authority by granting home rule to its
citizens. The municipality also oversees the city charter, where budgeting formulas are
implemented and maintained. For the past three decades, the police department influences
budgeting decisions through collective bargaining agreements but only by interacting with the
city and its budgeting officials. Under these circumstances, it appears the city plays a significant,
albeit underrecognized role in factors shaping police budgeting decisions.
Attempts at police budget reform may have been a more straightforward task for San
Francisco during the first seventy years of the 20th century due to budgeting authority lying in
the hands of the people. However, new evidence suggests that a police department and its union
can restrict budget cuts advocated for by citizens. Thus, the future of police budget reform
depends on defining whether the city can act as an intermediary between citizens and a police
department and what they are currently capable of doing to begin that process.

V. Data Analysis

To understand the municipality's ability to implement reform by divesting in a police
department, I return to my research question and ask, what influences municipal capacity to
reform police budgets? I find that the most influential factors affecting a city's ability to
implement police budget reform are informal perceptions and binding agreements—both
comprising inherent obstacles to reallocating police funds. Budgeting practices and labor
agreements prevent reforming significant portions of a police department's budget. City officials
claim that these formal barriers are frequently the result of political relationships and views
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towards the police.
There are four factors that most influence the city's capacity to reform the police budget:
San Francisco's sentiment towards labor, city officials' perception of police budget reform, the
involvement of the fire department during collective bargaining, and the role of the mayor. The
analysis I provide separates each of these findings into subsections, beginning with a study on
the city's sentiment towards labor, and concludes with a subsection presenting some key
observations linking all four of these factors.

Pro-Labor Sentiment
San Francisco city officials support a steady growth of funding for the police department
because they inherently value labor. As one city official stated, "the budget, as they say, is a
statement of values."75 San Francisco police officers are city employees, meaning the city
categorizes them as a classification of labor. 76 In this case, labor can also refer to employeerepresentative organizations, also known as unions. Thus, when a city or elected officials declare
they are pro-labor, they indicate that their values align with their city employees' interests.
One characteristic of being pro-labor is protecting employees from layoffs. One
interviewee said, "for a pro-labor Board, it is not popular to lay people off—it is never going to
be popular." 77 Downsizing through employee firings is an unattractive option for city officials
because losing one’s job is perceived as impacting the human component of labor. In response to
how the city approaches budgetary concerns brought on by stressful economic conditions, one
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participant stated, "Laying people off in order to balance our budget was one of our biggest
concerns...it was a very real possibility that we'd have to lay off thousands of people. We didn't
want to have to do that...people were terrified that they were going to lose their livelihood and
ability to support their families along with it."78
City officials express their pro-labor sentiment by negotiating and enacting labor
contracts that protect and secure large portions of the police department's budget. For instance,
police officer benefits, such as retirement plans, are labor agreements that maintain steady levels
of budgetary growth. Spending on pension plans is codified in the City charter (A8.605-3) for
police officers that match 3% of an officer's salary for each year worked.79 This retirement
guarantee is just one of many legally binding financial agreements that protect the police
department's budget from significant reductions.
Another employee benefit that affects the capacity to reform police budgets is overtime
costs. Three respondents verified that overtime was one of the most discussed issues while
making decisions regarding police budgeting. When unforeseen events such as parades or
demonstrations, for example, require an increase in municipal oversight, the city will frequently
send police officers to patrol even if that means working beyond their regular hours. In collective
bargaining agreements, overtime costs guarantee officers' pay be x1.5 their standard wage rate. 80
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Due to overtime costs, the funding for operational purposes increases to accommodate for
unexpected pay scales.
Yet overtime costs and pension plans only make up a fraction of the total composition of
the police department's budget. As Figure 1 displays, officer salaries represent the majority of
budget allocations during the thirty years studied. Annual Appropriation Ordinances and
Consolidated Budgets used for Figure 1 reveal that the police budget composition remains
essentially unchanged year-to-year (the average net change representing officer salaries as a total
police budget was 0.55%).
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Based on the budget composition and labor agreements, altering the police budget would

*

likely decrease salaries, benefits or result in layoffs. As one participant described, "And like
when [they] say Defund the Police? Do you realize that 90% of the police department’s budget is
people?... So, you know, if it gets right down to it, do you keep the super expensive stuff? Or do
you let people go?"81 This participant indicates that if the city reforms police funding, they
would harm job conditions or cut small portions that make up non-personnel costs. One
participant described those non-personnel costs as "funding for contracts and materials and
supplies, which is very small." 82 Therefore if a city cuts police funding while avoiding reducing
officer compensations, only an insignificant amount of the budget's total can be removed.
The enactment of labor agreements and wage protections suggests that the city values the
police for their role as city employees—enough to make budgeting decisions that inhibit the
capacity to reform the police budget beyond small, non-personnel costs. Thus, ingrained in city
hall is the sentiment towards protecting labor from budgetary reductions. The attitude towards
labor has made it so that when city officials see the movement for budget reform, the lens in
which they see the merits of the reform differs from advocates and some police reform scholars.
While not discounting the notion of police reform through budgetary reallocations, the
perception among city officials is that police budget reform is not only labor-invasive but also
challenges the status quo of practices many city officials prefer.

*

SFPD Officer Benefits in Figure 1 represent: overtime, holidays, special pays, court appearances, uniform and
clothing allowances, health insurance, wellness programs, paid sick leave, retirement, and other legally binding
wage agreements define in the active MOU. Data for this graph was obtained from the City and County of San
Francisco Office of the Controller's Consolidated Budget and Annual Appropriation Ordinances for Fiscal
Years 1990 to 2021.
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Perception of Police Budget Reform
San Francisco city officials view police budget reform implementation as interfering with
current public safety and budgeting methods. Like local Defund the Police organizations, police
budget reformists argue that eliminating spending in the police department's budget will reduce
the harmful effect policing has brought to San Francisco's BIPOC communities.83 City officials
do not deny the merits of this type of reform but do question the complicated restructuring
process to enact these reforms. According to city officials, implementation complications come
from replacing the means for public safety and restructuring the formula deciding the police
budget expenditures.
The first difference in perception of police budget reform is how it affects public safety.
Most participants who took part in my research believe that certain policing services are
necessary because the risk of their absence is too dangerous for city residents. As one city
official responded,
We have not set ourselves up for community policing or another type of policing
or other safety measures. I understand that. So, to cut them severely on their
budget without a backup on how to respond to certain incidents. I think that it is
not the right thing to do, and it is very unsafe too because we don't even have
another mechanism.84

As is currently proposed by San Francisco and national advocates, this interviewee suggests that
police budget reform is a process too rapid for the city to find decisive policing alternatives.
Instead, city officials perceive police budget reform as an avenue that will require proof that
other policing services can substitute the current policing methods used for public safety.
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Administrative restructuring, specifically through the budget, is the second perception
about police budget reform that proves problematic for city officials. This observation exists
because the notion of budget reform signifies to city officials a massive change in budgeting
practices. San Francisco city hall has 52 departments that require annual general fund
expenditures.85Addressing the budgetary needs of each department over the course of a year is a
lengthy process, so for the sake of time, police budgeting practices are formulaic and only allow
for minor adjustments in allocations.
A couple of participants explained that San Francisco is able to meet the budgetary needs
of departments annually partly due to the process’s avoidance of zero-based budgeting policies.
One respondent explained, "a lot of the [budgeting] process remains the same. We don't have to
remember, zero-based budgeting—you know, where we start entirely from scratch." 86 As a
result, the police department's budget allocations have remained consistent. For example, data
provided in Figure 2 finds that over the past thirty years, the police department's allocations as a
percentage of total general fund allocations have fluctuated modestly between 10% to 14%
(averaging a net change of total general fund expenditures of 0.45% from 1991-2020).

.
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Figure 2*
A reallocation of departmental funds would mean adjusting budgeting formulas that
account for the other 86-90% of total general fund allocations. The city then has to decide how to
reallocate those funds (e.g., direct all funding towards community-based alternatives, disperse
among other departments) on time with the budget cycle calendar. The process of restructuring
the budgeting formula for the police department, thus, involves consideration of how to
distribute funds, if any, to other departments. Although, city officials have a somewhat

*

Data for Figure 2 was obtained from the City and County of San Francisco Office of the Controller Consolidated Budget and Annual Appropriation Ordinances for fiscal years 1990 through 2021.
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obstructed view of which city departments deserve a portion of these reallocated funds because
of the relationship between the police and fire department.

Collective Bargaining for Public Safety
The San Francisco firefighter's union, Local 798, affects the capacity of the city to reform
police budgets during collective bargaining. For nearly 100 years the police and fire departments
in San Francisco have negotiated labor agreements with the city, albeit separate contracts,
alongside one another.87 This unofficial practice that began a century ago now contributes to a
deep-seated belief that both departments deserve identical settings and compromises during the
bargaining process.
Collective bargaining with police and firefighters’ unions in a similar fashion is hardly
unique to San Francisco. The Public Safety Employer-Employee Act (2007) grouped police and
fire department unions into federal legislation granting rights to fair collective bargaining
processes. The law set minimum criteria for states and municipalities to bargain in good faith
with organizations representing public safety officers, including "[any] employee of a public
agency who is a law enforcement officer, firefighter, or emergency medical services
personnel."88 The influence of this act is just one reason why San Francisco city leaders have
preserved the similarity of bargaining practices with both unions in recent years.
However, the formal process of negotiating labor contracts at the same time and fashion
first started developing in the early 2000s. After obtaining collective bargaining rights in 1990,

87

San Francisco Public Library, San Francisco Ballot Propositions Database. San Francisco Public Library
(San Francisco, CA): 2021.
88
Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act of 2007, 3, 1st sess., (July 18, 2007).

44
both the San Francisco Police Officer's Association and the firefighter’s union, Local 798, signed
their first legally binding memoranda of understanding (i.e., labor contract) in 2001.89 After
September 11, 2001, the appearance of local police officers and firefighters during collective
bargaining merged into a single image of "public safety." This image of public safety—one
combining both members of fire and police departments—makes police budget reform difficult
to appear non-invasive of the overall interests of the city's well-being.
The labor-based interests of both departments convolute the perception that police budget
reform is invasive to the fire department's budgetary concerns. When asked about the
relationship between the police and firefighter's union, one city official stated, "In negotiations,
they tried to work in tandem and be in alignment...I think they [SFPOA & Local 798] see their
interests aligned." 90 How police budget reform affects the interests of the police department,
then, is perceived to affect the interests of the fire department. For instance, reallocating funds
from the police department without reallocating fire department funds no longer handles both
unions' interests in a similar fashion. On the other hand, removing funds from both departments
is not a goal for police budget reformists or in the interests of city officials.
Disagreeing with a party's concerns that appear to represent public safety is not a popular
or advantageous stance for city officials during collective bargaining or budgeting decisions. The
notion that police budget reform might interfere with another department's resources, especially
those of the fire department, makes city officials hesitant to engage in discussions of police
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budget reform. While separating their interests may be difficult for city officials with limited
police budgeting authority, the influence and discretion of the mayor exceed limitations
identified in other departments.

Role of the Mayor
Mayoral influence on budgeting practices directly impacts the city's ability to reform the
police budget in two correlating ways: the political relationship with the police department and
the outcome of the mayor's proposed budget.
Over the past thirty years, mayors tend to maintain healthy relationships with the police
department for political gain. This relationship develops during election years when mayoral
candidates seek the endorsement of the police union. Over half of the participants in this study
claimed that in San Francisco, the police department's support is politically advantageous for
candidates. On the topic of the relationship between the police unions and the mayor during
elections, one of the respondents stated: "[mayors and candidates] have to consider upcoming
elections, you know, their reelection, or if they are running for higher office."91 Table 1
demonstrates the validity of these statements, showing that of the six of seven past mayoral
elections, the winning candidate received an endorsement from the police department's union.
The winning mayor responds to this endorsement by making budgetary decisions
favorable to the police department the following year when they have discretion over the annual
proposed budget. The timing of mayoral elections is an essential factor in police budgeting
decisions because election years have fallen in line with collective bargaining negotiations. Since
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1995, collective bargaining agreements follow a mayoral election year. Thus, the timing of the
election and negotiations is no coincidence and has prompted informal quid-pro-quos between
the mayors and the police department regarding budgetary arrangements.
Table 1 illustrates that of the seven elections since 1995, 5 police-endorsed mayors
proposed and approved an increase in general fund support based predominately on labor
agreements (as discussed in the first observation in this analysis section). In this case, the
increase in general fund allocations one fiscal year after an election reflects the political
relationship between the winning mayor and the police department.
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Election Years

SFPOA Endorsement

Winning Mayor

Police GFS 1-FY
after election

1995

Willie Brown

Willie Brown

-4.12%

1999

Willie Brown

Willie Brown

8.48%

2003

Gavin Newsom

Gavin Newsom

2.28%

2007

Gavin Newsom

Gavin Newsom

10.56%

2011

Ed Lee

Ed Lee

6.06%

2015

Ed Lee

Ed Lee

5.39%

Angela Alioto

London Breed / Mark
Farrell*

8.23%

2018

Table 1

The mayor can make these informal agreements due to San Francisco's structure of
governance. One participant succinctly defined the city's government structure by stating, "San
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Francisco is a city and county with a strong mayor and relatively weak board of supervisors." 93
Thus, this respondent refers to San Francisco's administrative structure operating under a "strong
mayoral-council government."94 In this system of governance, the mayor and city council (i.e.,
board of supervisors) work in tandem to balance a budget; however, as the city's chief executive,
the mayor drafts and proposes the budgets while maintaining authority to veto changes made by
the San Francisco Board of Supervisors.95 When asked about the influence of the mayor
compared to other city officials on police budgeting outcomes, one participant added, "This is
how the budget works. I would say the person who has the most power over the police budget is
the mayor. The mayor controls all the budgets; she gets first dibs at it." 96
The mayor gets first "dibs" at budgeting decisions due to the administrative structures
guiding the city's budget cycle and collective bargaining process. San Francisco mayors can use
the Department of Human Resources as a proxy during collective bargaining agreements to
negotiate police budgeting matters that affect the capacity for other city officials to consider
reform. According to the San Francisco City charter,
Agreements reached pursuant to this part by the authorized representatives for the
City and County of San Francisco, on behalf of its departments, boards, and
commissions, and the authorized representatives of recognized employee
organizations, once adopted by ordinance of the Board of Supervisors, shall be
binding on the City and County of San Francisco, and on its departments, boards,
commissions, officers and employees and on the recognized employee
organizations and their successors, and all employees in classifications they
represent.97
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Participants in this study identified the Department of Human Resources (DHR) as the
authorized representatives for the city and county of San Francisco, but only under the guidance
and influence of the mayor. Other departments, boards, and commissions are primarily
influenced by the mayor as well. As one participant explained,
The head of HR works at the pleasure of the mayor, and every [other] department
head works at the pleasure of the mayor. The mayor can fire any department head
except the ones who are elected. So, she can fire everyone [involved]. As for
department heads that are elected...she can cut their budget like crazy and chose
not to give them any money. So, she controls everything.98

This participant's response demonstrates the immense capacity the mayor has to affect police
budgetary change on a multitude of scales. I found that when speaking to this participant and
others, the mayor's role and influence was also an important factor due to the city's budget
calendar.
The San Francisco budget cycle begins with the mayor issuing budget instructions to city
departments, followed by departments sending their proposed budget to the controller's office. 99
After the controller's analysis and recommendations, it returns to the mayor's office so that the
mayor can draft a proposed budget.100 Next, the mayor proposes her budget to the SF Board of
Supervisors, which the board must then approve, where it finally returns to the mayor's desk for
additional approval and passage. 101 This style of budgeting, coupled with the consensus among
city officials that San Francisco is a strong-mayor governed city, signifies that reforming the
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police department's budget requires the involvement of the mayor in some capacity.
While the mayor's involvement during the collective bargaining process and budget cycle
are formal practices ingrained in city hall, the relationship between the mayor and the police that
influences the outcomes is not a feature that prevents the capacity for police budget reform.
Instead, the formal processes (e.g., proposed budgets) and informal practices (e.g., political
endorsements in exchange for budgetary increases) represent two sides of the same obstacle to
implementing police budget reform.

Informal Perceptions & Formal Barriers
This analysis demonstrates that all factors identified as most influencing the ability of the
city to implement police budget reform are also obstacles to reallocating police funds. These
factors separate into two general categories—informal perceptions and formal barriers. Informal
perceptions are factors that influence police budgeting decisions but do not inherently bind the
city to specific financial arrangements. For instance, the mayoral relationship with the police and
their union, collective bargaining practices with the fire department, and a widespread pro-labor
sentiment discourage San Francisco city officials from considering police budget reform. While
these influences have shaped the way the city prefers budgeting for police, they are unofficial
practices that do not entirely prevent the ability of the city to enact budgetary reform.
On the other hand, formal barriers are factors that strictly limit the capacity of the city to
change police department budget outcomes. Once there are: formulas established for allocating
all city department budgets, labor contracts activated, and proposed mayoral budgets in effect—
reforming the police department's budget becomes a process of administrative restructuring.
According to city officials and budget documents, the reformation of these factors is a lengthy
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and challenging process too extensive for the city to address currently.
Informal perceptions are also often responsible for the creation of formal barriers to
police budget reform. For example, a mayor's quid-pro-quo agreement with the police
department's union during elections are binding budgetary arrangements made during the
collective bargaining process. The city's pro-labor sentiment is another example of how the
perception of police budget reform affects budgetary allocations in terms of labor agreements
that protect wages from decreasing. Therefore, it is vital that policing scholars and advocates
recognize and classify these obstacles when navigating the future understanding and attempts at
police budget reform.

VII. Conclusion

Recognizing informal and formal obstacles in a municipality's capacity to reform police
budgets is essential to understanding the future implications of police budget reform. The recent
shift in police reform strategy to consider divestment in police budgets is a response to years of
police brutality, racial bias, and reforms that have failed to remedy these harms. However, it is
also important to recognize that the notion of police budget reform is not rooted in desperation.
On the contrary, this reorganization in police reform advocacy is a strategic move by determined
advocates to fix problems in policing by removing the investment in the problems (i.e., police)
altogether. According to current police budget reform narratives, removing officer presence and
reallocating resources to community-based alternatives will better resolve some of the recent and
systemic issues in law enforcement practices.
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This project finds that reforming the police through municipal budgeting practices bears a
multitude of difficulties. City officials did not question the reasons for police budget reform
during interviews; instead, the concern was regarding implementation methods under current
administrative structures, relationships, and legal boundaries. A key aspect to these arising
difficulties, in this case, is that the San Francisco municipal structure is strong mayor-council
based. Strong-mayoral council government structures effectively limit the number of avenues for
police budget reform to enter negotiations by a handful of actors that can decide budgetary
reallocations. Simply put, this government structure constrains city officials' and departments'
decision-making capability regarding budget reform compared to the mayor.
Another constraint for a city to consider police budget reform is that the current
conceptualization of public safety remains popular among voters and city officials. San
Franciscans have voted for mayors who have been given the San Francisco Police Officer's
Association endorsement in most elections over the past thirty years. These endorsements
originate from the police department's image representing public safety; thus, the endorsement
suggests the mayoral candidate represents the interests of public safety. Under these
circumstances, campaigning for police budget reform might be perceived as a movement against
an aspect of general security. This sentiment is also present within the ranks of city hall. During
labor agreements, the firefighter's union has tied its financial interests to the police unions and
vice versa. For the city to reform the police budget, officials are concerned about how reform
could affect the well-being of labor and the fire department's interests. This Capstone suggests
that to receive a more receptive audience to the calls for police budget reform, advocates—
specifically the Defund the Police campaign—must keep in mind a few considerations about
these significant obstacles.
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Defund the Police advocates are integrating campaign strategies that force city officials
and residents alike to take a serious look at the racism and violence fueled by funding police
departments. Although, the demand for this transition from established police department
funding is a shift in reform appearing too suddenly for city officials. City officials hear calls for
defunding the police as a demand for restructuring policing and citywide budgeting formulas.
Campaigning against municipal police budgeting practices is challenging for the Defund the
Police campaign because it requires undoing preferred and pre-determined methods cities
currently use to decide police budgets.
Police budget reform efforts will face difficulties when attempting to cut police
departments' budgets while presenting a narrative that their respective fire department's budgets
will remain unaffected. The symbiotic relationship between the police and firefighter unions'
interests is a relationship deeply ingrained in San Francisco for nearly one hundred years. The
starting methods for undoing this relationship may seem simple by negotiating under different
circumstances and years; however, the perception is still that reforming one department's budget
implicitly affects the other. Isolating the perception of the police department during collective
bargaining more than the practice itself is a key feature for the success of police budget reform
implementation. Although, removing the police budget from the general conception of labor is
complicated due to a police departments' budget composition codified by labor agreements.
Police budget reform demands reallocating police funds, but for the city, that means transferring
personnel costs away from the livelihood of their officers. From this perspective, there is little
incentive for a pro-labor city to consider these reform efforts.
Based on the findings in this thesis, I recommend that Defund the Police advocates
consider a few strategies to overcome some of these obstacles to increase a municipality's
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capacity to reshape the outcome of police budgets. Rather than try and restructure administrative
roles and labor contracts, for instance, advocates should attempt to overcome the informal
perceptions identified in this thesis. Overcoming informal perceptions is an appropriate strategy
because they are processes that do not require large-scale administrative changes. Defund the
Police advocates could identify spending issues, such as the reasons for overtime costs, and offer
alternatives that perform similar officer duties without leading to unexpected expenditures. This
narrative does not interfere with the processes behind police budget allocations but does give a
reason to allocate fewer dollars towards police overtime costs.
I also propose transforming the concept of public safety by removing a police
department's informal relationship with the fire department as another strategy to increase police
budget reform capacity. Defining the differences of needs and wants between police and
firefighter's unions could reveal an imbalance or inconsistency in departmental spending for
public safety. Providing these facts to city officials engaged in police union negotiations may
discourage these officials from convoluting the needs of firefighters in budgetary arrangements.
Lastly, I recommend the Defund the Police campaign advocate for narrowing the lens
through which the city views a police department's budget composition. Perceiving the police
budget as representing all of labor's interests is preventative to seeing the police department's
funding as a harmful practice in city governance. For example, suppose police budget reform
highlights detrimental effects of funding certain aspects of labor; in that case, a city might
identify and reduce pay given to officers who have a disciplinary record due to their
demonstrating prejudice or violence. However, advocates should caution this recommendation
because policing scholars have yet to analyze the implications and relationships between propolice budget reform and anti-labor sentiments.
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Perhaps the most noteworthy finding is that the methods behind police budget reform
might be considered anti-union in nature—thus anti-labor because unions represent the interests
of the city's labor force. Data on San Francisco's budget composition (Figure 1) and allocation
amounts (Figure 2) reveals that reallocating police funds means altering a well-practiced formula
designed to support healthy compensation for police officers. Thus, advocating for reallocations
can be translated as reducing labor costs, or in other words, advocating for a particular type of
labor reform.
Data in this Capstone suggests that labor reform, via budgetary reallocations, is innately
against the financial interests of unions. This confounding relationship partially occurs because
the concerns of unions are representative of labor-based interests. However, the Defund the
Police movement has the possibility to reframe the differences between anti-union and anti-labor
reforms by focusing on reducing future budget allocations. Reforming large portions of the
police budget, such as reallocating compensation expenditures, is impossible due to labor
agreements as well as a route most city officials would rather avoid trying to circumvent legally.
Reducing funding for future police budgets by freezing incoming police academy classes and
long-term hiring expenditures, on the other hand, is non-invasive to the interests of currently
employed or pensioned officers. Thus, Defund the Police advocates might benefit from
campaigning with a message that denotes police budget reform does not affect the current labor
interests, which may be more palatable to pro-labor city officials.
The Defund the Police movement can also benefit from a vigorous campaign against
future budgetary growth by potentially impeding the political clout of police unions. The San
Francisco Police Officer's Association's endorsement is a good representation of how unions
have become a formidable political player during mayoral elections. In return for their backing in
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this case study, the SFPOA benefits financially from a police-friendly mayor in the following
year. However, if police budget reform reduces or freezes the number of incoming officers, the
police union will have a smaller physical presence and fewer officers paying union fees. With
fewer police officers and reduced funding from decreasing membership, police unions will have
less capacity to donate and campaign for mayoral candidates. In this situation, a candidate for
mayor would less likely seek cooperation with a party unable to raise funds and participate in
grassroots efforts. Even with a police union's endorsement, the winning mayors might now be
less inclined to make a quid-pro-quo agreement with a police union because their backing did not
significantly contribute to the mayor's campaign victory. Then, there might be more room for
conversations with the mayor about police budget reform.
Although, discussions with city officials about police budget reform may be absent for
some time due to policing scholars just recently starting merging theories, research, and practices
in police reform and police budgeting literature. Recently, research has demonstrated that police
unions prevent police budget reforms. The data provided in this thesis support research on the
effects of unions by showing that labor agreements maintain incremental budgetary growth over
each year. This finding extends conversations regarding police unions and police budget reform
because it reinforces the notion that unions block budgetary reforms and further suggests that a
city enables labor organizations to find the means to protect their budgets from changes. These
police budget reform considerations also bring to light concerns that policing scholars should
consider moving forward.
There is no lack of information on police reform and police budgeting as separate bodies
of scholarship; although, policing scholars should consider asking the following questions when
merging the two. Firstly scholars should ask, can an organization or individual simultaneously be
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pro-police budget reform and pro-police union? If police budget reform dips into personnel costs
established by unions, is it inevitable that this type of reform is anti-labor? Also, scholars should
explore previous or existing labor reforms that include divesting funds away from a department
to fund other departments or programs outside their traditional jurisdictions. If there are
examples scholars can draw from, there might be a better understanding of the connection
between these two sentiments.
However, identifying binding agreements and informal perceptions as obstacles to police
budget reform is one of the initials steps towards finding solutions to successful implementation.
The methods involved in reaching the goals of movements like Defund the Police are just as
important as the possibility of achieving them. I hope that identifying factors that influence
municipal capacity to reform police budgets in this thesis contributes to moving police budget
reform conversations forward towards remedying the systemic problems in modern policing.
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